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Judicial Fitness for Review of Complex Biotechnology
Issues in Patent Litigation: Technical Claim
Interpretation
By Megan E. Lyman*
This article focuses on two recent cases in biotechnology that
have challenged both the district courts and the Federal Circuit in
their ability to analyze complex innovations and apply principles of
law and science to sound legal determinations. This article proposes
that the current structure of the courts does not afford adequate
protection to biotechnology and pharmaceutical inventions where an
issue hinges on scientific interpretation. To remedy this inadequacy,
changes in the background and expertise of judges should be made,
or more firm guidelines by the courts should be constructed.
Effecting changes in the structure of tribunals determining questions
involving complex claim terminology will ensure confidence in the
patent system and allow the continued progress of technology.
INTRODUCTION
The quantity of information required to understand the science
underlying advancements in biotechnology has increased
exponentially in the last twenty years.1 The rise in the technical
nature of biotechnology innovations has resulted in a plethora of
patent applications as well as filings with the patent office to
* The author would like to thank Will Bollard and Tyson Popp for their helpful
feedback and review of this article, as well as the members of the N.A.A.L.J.
Journal for their diligent editing. The author would like to express her appreciation
and gratitude to her husband, Scott, and family for their unending support in school
and in life.
1. Other News To Note, 13 (135) BIOWORLD TODAY, July 12, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 5615323.
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invalidate patents and claims of infringement.2 However, this
increase has not been met with a concurrent rise in the expertise
required of adjudicators in deciding these issues. The biotechnology
industry has presented the courts with a whole new language that is
difficult to understand even by the cohorts of those scientists bringing
claims. Therefore, it is only natural that with this change in
technology, the judicial system should respond to ensure that
confidence in the system remains intact.
Current advances in the biotechnology field promise new
therapeutics for genetic disease and cancers that have plagued our
society for generations. For instance, the company ALS has
launched a multi-million dollar research project to increase the rate at
which genes involved in Lou Gehrig's disease are identified.
Additionally, Geron Corp. has granted a nonexclusive license to
Variagenics Inc., concerning their human telomerase 4 reverse
transcriptase technology for pharmacogenomic applications. 5
Research and development in these areas requires a complex
understanding of human physiology and drug delivery technologies. 6
Consequently, the scientific community deserves courts that can
understand their claims and apply the law appropriately and justly.
To meet that call, there has been a rise in the number of law students
2. In 1999, the group handling patents in biotechnology, chemistry, and
pharmaceuticals at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office reported receipt of
approximately 31,000 patent applications. Miguel Sanchez Padron & Mikel
Gomez Uranga, Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: A Burden Too Heavy
For the Patent System, 35(2) J. ECON. IssuEs 315 (2001) available at 2001 WL
21300784. Additionally, patent law itself has undergone many changes when
looking at modifications made within one year of the American Inventors
Protection Act of 1999. Nathaniel Hernandez, Patent Lawyers Travel the Fast
Lane to Keep Pace with Global Changes, 24(4) CHICAGO LAWYER, April 9, 2001,
at 8.
3. Id.
4. Telomerase is an enzyme that places "extra" DNA at the end of each
chromosome (called the telomeres) after replication of DNA, it is thought that the
shortening of telomeres may cause diseases having to do with aging. BRUCE
ALBERTS, ET. AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, 364 (5th ed. 1994).
5. Id.
6. Drug delivery technologies encompass devices that are developed to deliver
therapeutics to the patient.
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with technical backgrounds that will be able to apply their scientific
knowledge to the law.7
Amgen is currently the number one biotechnology corporation in
the United States based on market capitalization and products
introduced into the market. 8 Amgen has continuously defended the
validity of its patents and itself in infringement suits.9 Many of those
decisions made at the district court have been upheld on appeal.' °
Courts however, have had difficulty analyzing scientific issues and
language as illustrated in Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc.11 In that
case the Federal Circuit vacated, in part, the decision of the district
court because terms in the patent were interpreted incorrectly.1 2 The
terms that were misunderstood involve the "control region" of a gene
that is inserted into bacteria to make large amounts of a target
protein. 13 More recently, a court had similar troubles in Amgen, Inc.
v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. 14 In that opinion, the Federal Circuit
partially reversed the district court's ruling, stating that the court had
"eschewed the cardinal principle that the accused device must be
compared to claims rather than to a preferred or commercial
7. Kelly Kordzik, Small New World, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at C1.
8. Amgen and Pfizer Top Market Capitalization Lists in Genetic Engineering
News, BusiNEss WIRE, June 3, 2002. Amgen's rating is based on protein
therapeutics, which can be distinguished from pharmaceutical products and their
corporations. Id.
9. Apart from the two cases discussed in this article, Amgen has been a party
in two other recent opinions. Amgen, Inc. v. Scully, 234 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C.
2002), Jensen v. Amgen, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 4th 1322 (2003). Amgen has also
been involved in disputes that have been settled out of court. Amgen: Biotech
company forecasts strong 2003 financial performance, BIOTECH WK., Feb. 12,
2003, available at 2003 WL 9037781 (discussing Amgen's recent settlement with
Johnson and Johnson).
10. Pamela Sauer, Amgen Prevails in Key EPO Patent Suit, 259(5) CHEMICAL
MARKET REP. 18 (2001), available at 2001 WL 8709537.
11. Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (This case is now known as Aventis Pharmaceuticals).
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embodiment."' 15  These cases, albeit only focusing on one
biotechnology company's litigation in the past year, serve as
examples of the complexities of biotechnology litigation and the
urgent need for adjudicators with the appropriate experience and
knowledge in this area, as well as clearly defined law to follow.
This comment makes various alternate proposals to remedy the
current situation. Perhaps review of Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") determinations should be reviewed with more deference at
the district court level, giving heed to the expertise that employees of
that agency, which is nearly absent at the district court level.
Alternatively, perhaps patent litigation should be appealed to the
Federal Circuit, circumventing the district court. This alternative
would give deference to the expertise and the ideology on which the
court was created almost twenty years ago.16 To an even higher
extent, Judges serving on the Federal Circuit could be required to
have a general background in current technologies, acquired either
through previous study, or even more helpful, through continuous
education during their tenure. Alternatively, judges could employ
special technical masters on a formal basis to aid in interpretation of
these complex issues. It may be necessary for the courts to interpret
rules in determining claim construction, and other issues that dealing
primarily with the technicality of the science of the innovation with
less ambiguity. This would provide a firm template for a reviewing
court to follow, thus easing their burden of learning the science to the
extent that it must be understood in order to render a fair verdict.
Section I of this article reviews the current structure of the PTO,
in particular the rules used by that agency to make determinations of
infringement or claim construction. Additionally, Section I discusses
the standards of review applied at the trial and appellate level.
Section II of this article is a "biotechnology primer" in order to
understand the technical issues presented in Genentech v. Amgen and
Amgen v. Hoechst. Section III outlines the Genentech, decision in
the context of claim interpretation and also looks through Hoechst,
15. Id. at 1347.
16. The Federal Circuit's predecessor was the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("CCPA") which was formed in 1929. In re Leuders, 111 F.3d 1364,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Pub.L. No. 914, 70th Cong. (Mar. 2, 1929).
with its related issues decided by the Federal Circuit. Section IV
proposes various modifications that could be made to the judicial
system with respect to determinations involving issues in
biotechnology. This comment is concluded in Section V.
I. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE
A. Expertise of the Patent and Trademark Office
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") is a government
agency operating in the Department of Commerce, and is authorized
by Congress to issue patents to persons who invent products or
processes that are novel, nonobvious, and useful. 17 For a product or
process to be considered novel, it must be new, and not introduced to
the public prior to the patent application.18 Biotechnology companies
may also obtain patent protection on both the equipment and
processes developed to create novel genes and organisms.' 9 A patent
17. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2003).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003).
19. See Theodore A. Feitshans, A Review of U.S. Intellectual Property Law
Applicable to Inventions in Biotechnology: U.S. Intellectual Property Law
Continues to Demonstrate its Adaptability to New Technology, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 7, 8-9 (2001); Philip W. Grubb, Patents for Chemicals, PHARMACEUTICALS AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 225-27 (1999). The Supreme Court has held that living
organisms or parts of living organisms are patentable. See Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980); Grubb at 233-34. Even though Louis
Pasteur was granted a U.S. patent in 1873 for a living organism, this precedent was
not followed by the USPTO until Chakrabarty. See Grubb, at 225-27. Patenting a
living organism poses special issues for the patent system. Section 112 of the
Patent Act requires:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor for carrying out
his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
judicial Fitnessl nll 2003
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application must be made in the name of the inventor, although that
inventor may assign patent rights to other parties.20
In order to retain protection for inventions, the inventor must file
a patent application with the PTO within one year of the first
commercial use or publication of the invention. 21 Generally, a valid
patent affords protection for a term of twenty years from the date of
filing the application. 22 This term of protection allows the owner to
exclude all others from making, using, or selling any product or
process that contains or uses the patented technology. 23  Once a
patent is assigned, it is presumed to be valid; this presumption is
overcome only by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.24 When another party infringes on the patent, they
are liable to the patent owner for damages, even when the infringer is
unaware of the patent or the infringement.25
Patent applications submitted to the PTO for review, claims of
infringement, or requests for reexamination are first reviewed by
examiners within the agency. PTO examiners are required to have
technical backgrounds.26  For example, a biotechnology patent
examiner must have a bachelor's degree in biology, chemistry,
biomedical engineering or biochemical engineering.27 In the area of
20. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2003).
21. § 102(b). This one-year statutory period is begun by satisfying the
following two-part test established in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., "(1) the
invention must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale; and (2) the invention
must be ready to be patented." Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-69(1998). The second prong of the test can be satisfied by "proof of a reduction to
practice," or by "proof that the inventor developed drawings or other materials
sufficient to permit one skilled in the art to practice the invention." Feitshans,
supra note 19 at 9 (citing Juan C. Gonzales, The On-Sale Bar to Patentability: The
U.S. Supreme Court Sheds Some Light, 40 J.L. & TECH. 83, 88 (2000)). This test
serves as a warning to biotech companies to install a comprehensible intellectual
property policy to retain the fruits of their labors. Id. at 9.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2003).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2003).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2003).
25. § 271.
26. Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing
New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 843 (1999) (citing USOPM-
Job Details at http://www.usajobs.com.opm.gov/wfjic/jobs/BG1809.HTM (visited
January 6, 2003)).
27. Id.
biotechnology alone, the PTO employs more than 150 PhDs.28
Paradoxically, there is no such requirement for judges on the Federal
Circuit. Moreover, in the PTOs appellate body, the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, examiners-in-chief are required by statute to
be proficient both scientifically and legally.29 Additionally, unlike the
Federal Circuit, the "PTO can conduct public hearings to familiarize
itself with technology in a particular industry." 30 This methodology, in
contrast to those judges who do hire technical experts to aid them in
patent litigation determinations, allows for a relatively unbiased
interpretation of the technology from many different viewpoints.
B. Procedures Used by the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
United States Code Title 35 and Title 37 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights govern the PTO.31
The statute is law, and cannot be ignored or waived by the PTO,
although the rules may be suspended or waived as justice requires.
The PTO is bound by the decisions handed down by the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court. These decisions generally become
available to examiners in the form of guidelines that are incorporated
to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP"). These
three sources together allow the PTO to make determinations
concerning applications for a patent, filing for infringement, and
requesting amendments or reexamination of existing patents.
Although the procedures outlined in the MPEP are not binding on a
court of law, the Federal Circuit nonetheless regards them as firm
guideposts. 32 Further, the Federal Circuit has recognized that judicial
28. Id. (citing Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 57
OHIO ST. L. J. 1415, 1506 n.352 (1995)).
29. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2002) (The examiners-in-chief or
"administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and
scientific ability.")).
30. Id. (citing Nard, supra note 28, at 1501 and n.1818 ("discussing the PTO's
public hearings with the biotechnology and computer software industries")).
31. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1-10; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.
32. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 606 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing In
re Kaghan 387 F.2d 398, 401 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (determining that appellants may
rely on procedures outlined in the MPEP)).
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notice may be given to the MPEP to the extent that it does not
conflict with statute.33
Certain sections of the Code are frequently cited and referred to
in claims of infringement. The information herein is provided so as
to understand claims presented in the cases below. Both cases
involve claims of infringement. Infringement occurs when a person
makes, sells, offers for sale, or imports, without authorization, any
patented invention within the United States during the term of the
patent.34 Where one party alleges infringement, it almost always
follows that the other will attack the patent's validity, thereby
alleviating the infringement claim if the patent is found invalid.
A valid patent must comply with § 112 of the Patent Statute,
which contains the requirements of specification.35 The patent must
contain "a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it . . . [such] as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains.., to make and use the same..
S.36 More simply, this statute conveys two separate and independent
requirements for a valid patent: (1) an applicant must adequately
describe the claimed invention and (2) enable its reproduction and
use. 37 Additionally, the applicant must disclose what is considered
the best mode of practicing the invention.
A valid application will also have sufficient claim definiteness.38
The requirement of claim definiteness is satisfied where the claims in
a patent are "sufficiently precise to permit a potential competitor to
determine whether or not he is infringing. ' 39 This requirement is not
stringent however, indefiniteness can be found where the claim is
"insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can properly
33. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003). See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323
F.3d 956, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172,
1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003) (defining patent infringement).
35. § 112.
36. Id.
37. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
38. § 112.
39. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
be adopted."4 ° In Amgen v. Hoechst, the court adopts the rule in
Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation stating that indefiniteness
exists if "when read in light of the specification, it does not
reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the
invention. 41
Valid patents are issued where the invention was not known by
others or described in a printed publication before the invention by
the applicant, or there is no prior art describing the invention in
total.42 Additionally, subject matter that would be deemed obvious at
the time of the invention by another having ordinary skill in the art to
which the invention applies is not patentable.43
These rules are applicable to all patents. Generally, natural
phenomena are not patentable.44 However if the living matter is the
result of human intervention, a valid patent may be issued.45 To
complicate matters further in the field of biotechnology, the PTO has
not defined "gene.",46 This prevents applicants from obtaining patent
protection for nucleotide sequences with no known applications other
than that they will be the subject for further research.47 However, in
the absence of a definition, inventors are afforded a broader spectrum
of what can be considered a gene and what functional gene products
will be patentable.
Patent law is fluid and has experienced many recent changes.
These changes, however are often not subject to notice and comment
rulemaking. 48  For instance, the PTO recently clarified the utility
40. Exxon Research Camp Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
41. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (citing Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (citing Personalized Media Comm., LLC v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1998))).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2003).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003).
44. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
45. Id.
46. See 64 Fed. Reg. 71,427, 71,431 (1999).
47. See Grubb, supra note 19, at 252.
48. Agencies are able to enact and write rules as proscribed in their enabling
act. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, §553 rules made by agencies require
a notice and comment period before implementation of the rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553
judicial FitnessFall 21103
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requirements for gene patents under sections 101 and 102 of the
patent statute, 49 and the written description requirement under section
112, paragraph 1.50 Both clarifications govern internal practices of
the PTO and thus the changes are exempt from notice and comment
rulemaking. 51 Rules promulgated by the PTO are often interpreted
and clarified at the court level. For instance, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 a
patentable invention must have "utility."52 This term has caused
problems in interpretation. A recent decision by the Federal Circuit
clarified that "[t]he threshold of utility is not high: An invention is
useful under section 101 if it is capable of providing some
identifiable benefit.- 53 Frequent changes in the law require diligence
both in lawyering and in adjudication. These changes are often
difficult to grasp and apply absent a firm scientific background.
Understanding of the science underlying these technologies can aid
the adjudicator in discerning how changes in the law affect a patent at
issue.
C. Judicial Review of PTO Action by the District Court
The PTO follows the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").54 As such, under § 706 of the APA, standards of review by
(West, WESTLAW, through 1966 acts). Certain types of rules are exempt from the
notice and comment rulemaking procedure, including those that govern internal
practices. Id.
49. See 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440, 71,441 (1999).
50. See 64 Fed. Reg. 71,427, 71,427 (1999). See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-
Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
51. See 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440, 71,441 (1999).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
53. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
54. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). In this case a patent applicant
appealed the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences which
rejected the patent application relating to a method for improving security systems.
Id. The Federal Circuit reversed, 111 F.3d 887, and again reversed on rehearing en
banc, 142 F.2d 1447 after applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Id.
The Federal Circuit claimed that it was exempt from the traditional standard of
review for agency action upon 5 U.S.C. § 559 that states that the APA does "not
limit or repeal additional requirements .. .recognized by law." Dickinson, 527
U.S. at 154 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2003)). The Circuit asserted that the special
tradition of strict review by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA" the
the district court are dependent on whether the issue is a question of
law or fact. In pertinent part, this section states that:
To the extent necessary . . . the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law ... and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-.., hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be- (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law; ... (E) unsupported by substantial evidence...
55
This standard, however has not always been followed by district
courts reviewing PTO determinations. Until the Supreme Court's
decision in Dickinson v. Zurko, courts frequently applied the "clearly
erroneous" test rather than the "substantial evidence" test proscribed
by the APA.56 In the Supreme Court's opinion, Justice Breyer held
that the APAs standards governing the judicial review of findings of
fact made by federal administrative agencies applies when the
Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact made by the PTO.57 Thus,
the APAs "substantial evidence" standard of review, rather than the
stricter "clearly erroneous" standard, was applied to the Federal
Circuit's review of PTO findings of fact when reviewing PTOs denial
of a patent application. 58  The distinction between "substantial
evidence" and "clearly erroneous" is slight, the latter applies in
appellate review of district court factual findings. The "substantial
predecessor court of the Federal Circuit) consequently amounted to an "additional
requirement" that under § 559 trumps the requirements imposed by § 706. A
dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Rehnquist, which Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg joined. Id.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2003).
56. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 150. In Dickinson after closely examining 89 pre-
APA CCPA determinations, the court found no well-established court/court
standard. Id. at 155. Phrases such as "clear case of error," "clearly wrong," and
"manifest error" do not conclusively signal a specific standard of review. Id.
Although these phrases are not terms of art, they clearly demonstrate the intent to
apply court/agency standard, not court/court.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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evidence" standard is "highly deferential" and can be satisfied by
showing "a rational connection ... between an agency's fact-findings
and its ultimate action., 59  The "clearly erroneous" standard,
however, has been described by the Supreme Court as "somewhat"
less deferential, requiring the reviewing judge to have a "'definite
and firm conviction' that an error has been committed., 60 Thus, it
may be that application of either standard would not be outcome
determinative in any case. 61
The Court's determination in Dickinson was later upheld in In re
Gartside by the Federal Circuit applying the "substantial evidence"
standard to PTO findings of fact.62 The Federal Circuit further opined
that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard would be appropriate as
default when the substantial evidence standard is not appropriate.63
The substantial evidence standard will apply under the APA to
review "on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." 64
Although the "substantial evidence" standard of review affords some
deference to the PTO in their determinations, it would seem that the
agency's technical expertise in the area of science and technology
59. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (explaining substantial evidence "as
requiring a court to ask whether a 'reasonable mind might accept' a particular
evidentiary record as 'adequate to support a conclusion."') (citation omitted).
60. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 162 (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)); Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. 206,
229(1938). The "substantial evidence" standard as applied to court/agency
interactions requires a court to ask whether a "reasonable mind might accept" a
particular evidentiary record as "adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting
Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S.206, 229). In contrast the court/court "clearly
erroneous" standard requires a reviewing judge to have a "definite and firm
conviction" that error has been committed. Id. (United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. at 395.)
61. Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A. Castanias, Mark N. Reiter & Lawrence D.
Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal Circuit's Patent Law Decisions in 2000: Y2K in
Review, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1441 (2001).
62. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1315.
63. Id. at 1312.
64. Id. at 1313.
essential to understanding the basis for the invention would be
accounted for by more deference to PTO determinations.
65
When courts is review issues of claim construction in patent
issues, the claim language defines the scope. The first step in an
infringement analysis is to determine the meaning and scope of the
claims that have been allegedly infringed.66 In order to properly
analyze the claims in the patent at issue the court must examine the
claims, the rest of the specification, and if available, the prosecution
history.67 When interpreted correctly, claims can then be compared
to the accused invention to determine whether the claims have been
infringed either literally or equivalently.
68
The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created doctrine that is
applied in patent infringement issues.69  The doctrine permits
recovery for infringement when the accused device fails to fall within
the literal scope of the claim.70 The doctrine of equivalents teaches
that even where a product or process does not literally infringe on
patent claims there can be infringement where there is "equivalence"
when comparing the elements of the accused product or process and
those elements of the patented invention.7 1 The Supreme Court has
stated that showing that the accused product is the overall equivalent
will not be sufficient to establish infringement under the doctrine,
65. This contention is tempered by the PTOs interest in having patents, which
may be unbiased as stated by other authors. See generally Rai, supra note 26, at
827.
66. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir.
1995), aff'd 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that interpretation of language set forth
in the claim is an issue for the judge rather than the jury).
67. Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
68. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v Brunswick Corp., 228 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
69. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, ROBERT C. HIGHLEY, & DONALD C. REILEY
III, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 18:49 (2d ed. 2002); See R. D. Hantman,
Patent Infringement, 72 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 454 (1990).
70. MILLS III, supra note 69, at § 18:49; Environmental Instruments, Inc., v.
Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (disapproved on other
grounds); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Intern., Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
71. MILLS 1II, supra note 69, at § 18:49; Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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each claim of the invention must be analyzed separately.7 2
Infringement may be found where the accused product "performs
substantially the same overall functions or work, in substantially the
same way, to obtain substantially the same overall result as the
claimed invention" even where a single claim in the patent can be
read literally on the accused product.73 Where the court is looking at
claim construction for purposes of literal infringement the doctrine of
equivalents is equally applicable.74 Application of the doctrine is
regarded as an exception rather than a rule. 75 The doctrine prevents
the alleged infringer from avoiding liability by changing only minor
or insubstantial details of the claimed invention while still retaining
functionality. 76
D. Federal Circuit Review of District Court Findings
In order to preserve clarity and continuity in jurisprudence, the
Federal Circuit adheres to specific standards of review over the
decisions of its lower tribunals. 77 The Federal Circuit was established
in 1982 to establish nationwide uniformity in the application and
administration of patent laws.78 The Federal Circuit, pursuant to
72. MILLS III, supra note 69, at §18:49.
73. MILLS III, supra note 69, at § 18:49; Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters,
280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929); Molinaro v. Hart Electronics Corp. of Scranton, 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 735, 738 (M.D. Pa) (citing Patent Law Fundamentals).
74. MILLS Il,, supra note 69, at § 18:49; Uniroyal, Inc. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.,
939 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
75. MILLS III,, supra note 69, at §18:49; Extrel FTMS, Inc. v. Bruker
Instruments, Inc., 954 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
76. MILLS III, supra note 69, at § 18:49; Sage Prods, Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc.,
126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
77. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
78. Lawrence M. Sung, Echoes of Scientific Truth in the Halls of Justice: The
Standards of Review Applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Patent-Related Matters, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1233, 1236 (1999) (citing S.
Rep. No. 275, at 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12 (describing the
legislative rationale for establishing the Federal Circuit by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2003)). The Federal Circuit's predecessor was the
CCPA, which had jurisdiction under essentially the same provisions.
statute,79 has jurisdiction to hear appeals "arising under patent law in a
district court." 80 "Original appellate court jurisdiction is conferred by
35 U.S.C. § 141 (patents) and 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (trademarks)."-8 1
The Federal Circuit was created in an effort to provide uniformity in
patent law interpretation leading to a greater predictability in the
outcome of patent cases.82 This, in turn, would increase confidence in
the patent system and thereby "enhance willingness to make the
business and economic investments that lie at the heart of the patent
system's abilities to spur innovation, to enhance technical growth, and
to contribute to our nation's industrial strength. 83 Where the Federal
Circuit is reviewing a district court judgment in a patent case, Federal
Circuit law is applied to patent law issues, including procedural issues,
but "the law of the circuit in which the district court sits" is applied to
non-patent issues. 84
The Federal Circuit has authorized and encouraged the liberal use
of summary judgment rulings to dispose of patent claims at the
district court level.85 The Federal Circuit's reviews those decisions
de novo.86  Issues of law, including issues involving claim
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1296(a)(1) (2003).
80. Thomas G. Field, Jr., Direct Judicial Review of PTO Decisions:
Jurisdictional Proposals, 42 IDEA 537, 539 (2002).
81. Id at 539. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) & (B) (2003). Jurisdiction
is not exclusive, however; see 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2003) and 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)
(2003). Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A. Castanias, Mark N. Reiter & Lawrence D.
Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal Circuit's Patent Law Decisions in 2000: Y2K in
Review, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1441 (2001) (quoting U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray,
212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
82. Mark T. Banner, Is Markman Right? 7(3) THE ABA SECT. OF
INTELLECTUAL PROP. L., CHAIR'S BULLETIN 1 (November 2002).
83. Id.
84. Adamo, supra note 81, at 1457 (quoting Midwest Indust., Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
85. Adamo, supra note 81, at 1441.
86. See Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, 201 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(citing Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1996));
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Review of district
court determinations by the Federal Circuit is for clear error in patent claims of
anticipation. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison, 227 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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construction 87 and enablement 88 determined at the district court are
also reviewed de novo. In contrast, "[c]ompliance with the written
description requirement is essentially a fact-based inquiry that will
'necessarily vary depending on the nature of the invention
claimed.' ' 89 This fact-sensitive inquiry is thus reviewed for clear
error on appeal. 90 Infringement errors determined by the trial court
are also reviewed for clear error.91
Despite the Federal Circuit's genesis as a court of technology and
innovation, the majority of judges on the Federal Circuit do not have
technical backgrounds, especially in the area of biotechnology.
92
This begs the question: Why were they chosen specially to hear these
types of cases?
Other authors have explored uncertainty regarding the credibility
of judicial determinations at the Federal Circuit.93 Particularly, Dr.
Sung's article addresses the difficulty of finding justice in patent law
decisions made by the "Federal Circuit in the face of apparent
misapplications, or seemingly intentional ignorance, of otherwise
accepted scientific or engineering principles." 94 Further, that "patent
law treats science apart from innovation, but embraces both as
important concerns to implement the social policy of fostering
technological progress." 95 The court has made attempts at closing
this information gap. The modern development of rapidly advancing
87. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (characterizing claim construction as an issue of law).
88. Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing
enablement as an issue of law).
89. Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted).
90. Purdue Pharma L. P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citations omitted).
91. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
92. Rai, supra note 26, at 838 (noting that only Judges Gajarsa, Lourie, and
Newman have an undergraduate or advanced degree in a natural science). See
generally Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, Federal Circuit (available on Westlaw,
2003) (providing biographical information on Federal Circuit judges including their
education).
93. Sung, supra note 78 at, 1238.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1242.
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technologies such as biotechnology and software has led the Federal
Circuit to make extra efforts to provide detailed primers on relevant
technical matters. 96 Additionally, some judges on the Federal Circuit
employ clerks with technical backgrounds who are able to lend
scientific expertise to their opinions. These actions, however, have
not been enough for the Federal Circuit to keep up to date with rising
technologies. Further, the Circuit has had to deal with district court
rulings that are ambiguous and thus difficult to analyze at the
appellate level.
In 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed the need for clear district
court rulings in two instances.97  In Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.98 the Federal Circuit provided clear guidance to the
district courts about the significance of evidence regarding the
interpretation and meaning of claim terms.99 The court also affirmed
its precedent in considering relevant patent related documents for
proper claim interpretation.' 00 This "intrinsic" evidence includes
both the patent itself (the specification and the claims) and the
prosecution history (the record of proceedings before the PTO).'01
The court also approved the examination of "extrinsic" evidence such
as expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises to
inform the state of the technology or "prior art" at the time of
96. Id. at 1242 (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 856 (1991) (explaining the technical background
for a patent describing a method for producing erythropoietin)); In re O'Farrell,
853 F.2d 894, 895-99 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (needing a technical explanation of an
invention in genetic engineering)).
97. Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(reversing the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on claims of
non-infringement because the district court did not adequately justify its ruling);
Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 224 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(affirming the district court's denial without explanation of Cultor's motion to
amend complaint because of the futility of the requested relief further indicating
that full explanation by the district court is required).
98. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff'd 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (determining the meaning of "inventory" as the
main issue in a case alleging infringement of a patent for an automated inventory
system for monitoring articles of clothing for commercial laundry and dry
cleaning).
99. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-83.
100. Id. at 979-80.
101. Id. at 980.
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invention. 102 The Circuit emphasized that extrinsic evidence is not to
be used to clarify ambiguity in claim language or to vary or
contradict the meaning of claim terms, but to assist in the court's
understanding of the patent. 10 3
Generally, the Federal Circuit's review of legal conclusions of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the PTOs appellate tribunal,
is "without formal deference." 10 4 Findings of fact made by the Board,
however, are reviewed under the "substantial evidence" standard. 10 5
Whether a patent specification adequately describes the subject matter
claims is a question of fact. 10 6 This allows the Board to apply its
technical expertise with assurance that deference will be afforded to
that determination in analyzing the actual "science" of the innovation.
In order to properly review the Board's rulings, the Federal Circuit
must have "a clear understanding of the grounds for the decision being
reviewed." 107
II. SCIENCE PRIMER
In order to appreciate recent decisions by the Federal Circuit
regarding biotechnology issues it is important to understand the basic
science underlying the innovations at issue. Since 1953 it has been
understood that the biological code for life was made up of a double
helix strand of four repeating nucleotides, adenosine, guanine,
cytosine, and thymine, known as DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid).'0 8
There are approximately 6 billion pairs of subunits of DNA in one
102. Id at 980; Sung, supra note 78, at 1260.
103. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980; Sung, supra note 78, at 1260.
104. In re Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing 5
U.S.C.§ 706 (2003).
105. Id. at 1371 (quoting In re Gartside 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
106. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
107. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Gechter v.
Davison, 116 F.3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that the "central thrust of
Gechter" is that the Patent Board must explain sufficiently its rulings in order to
facilitate a meaningful judicial review)).
108. DANIEL J. FAIRBANKS & W. RALPH ANDERSEN, GENETICS; THE
CONTINUITY OF LIFE, 25-26 (Thomas Learning 1999).
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human cell. 10 9 A gene is a subunit of DNA that encodes a protein.
All enzymes are made of protein, and those enzymes are responsible
for driving human physiology. The process of obtaining the
information from a sequence of DNA gene to make its protein is
called transcription. This process is triggered through cellular
machinery attaching to the DNA sequence located just before, or
"upstream" from the start of the gene called the promoter.
DNA
RNA
translation
Protein
Figure 1: The process of transcription and translation
After the gene is activated, the DNA nucleotides of the gene are
read by cellular machinery (RNA polymerase) and transcribed into
mRNA (messenger ribonucleic acid) whose components are similar
to DNA and contain guanine, adenosine, cytosine, and uracil rather
than thymine. RNA is also distinguished from DNA by its sugar
chemistry. The RNA sequence is less stable than DNA, and is read
by other cellular machinery (ribosomes) in the process of translation
to make an amino acid sequence that can fold into the functional
protein (See Figure 2).110
109. Id. at 26.
1 10.Figure 2 is available
http://www.engineering.ucsb.edu/-trevorc/images/tech/translation'Jpg.
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Figure 2: the process of transcription
In a bacterial cell, the initiation of translation occurs when the
ribosomes read the mRNA and find the Shine-Dalgamo sequence
(AGGAGG) followed by the three nucleotide sequence that encodes
for the first amino acid, methionine (ATG). 111 During translation,
cellular machinery continues to read the RNA sequence three
nucleotides (one codon) at a time. Each set of three nucleotides
encodes for one amino acid. This code is "degenerate" meaning that
one amino acid may be translated by more than one codon. 112
Consequently, the mRNA, and therefore DNA, sequence cannot be
deciphered by mere knowledge of the amino acid sequence. After
translation is complete an amino acid sequence is produced and, once
properly folded, will make the functional protein.
Biotechnologists have been able to decipher the genetic code and
manipulate fast-growing organisms that allow the production of
target proteins in mass quantities. Bacteria are often the organism of
choice where scientists can insert the DNA gene and allow the
111. FAIRBANKS, supra note 108, at 108.
112. Id. at 91. If there were one amino acid per codon there would be 43.
possibilities, or 64 different amino acids, however there are in fact only 20.
bacteria to go through the process of making the protein at a fast rate
and in high quantities. Scientists are able to fine tune the production
of a protein by inserting additional information either before or after
the gene that allows production of the protein to begin after a
triggering event, or allow control over the rate of production.
Perhaps the most well known application of this process is that of
producing insulin as a therapeutic remedy for patients with
diabetes. 113
This technology is discussed and analyzed in both cases
discussed below. In Genentech Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., Amgen's process
of making a drug protein, called Neupogen® is "grown" by this
method in bacterial cells. 14 The dispute in that case arises over the
DNA sequence that is before the gene that drives transcription, and
consequently the production of protein. 115 In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoescht
Marion Roussell, Inc., Amgen sued for infringement and Hoescht is
attacking Amgen's patents concerning the process and product that
produces Amgen's drug, Epogen®.116  Similar to Neupogen®,
Epogen® is also "grown" in a cell system, but instead of bacteria,
scientists have used mammalian cells 17 to make a functional drug
that will stimulate red blood cell production. In that case, Hoescht
was able to make the same drug product called DynepoTM , but
through a different process and Amgen sued for infringement of its
113. Id. at92.
114. Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In 2001,
Neupogen® had $1.3 million in sales. Genentech-Amgen Battle Back On,
CHEMICAL WK., PHARMACEUTICALS & FINE CHEMICALS 30, May 8, 2002, at 30.
115. Genentech, Inc., 289 F.3d at 764.
116. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d. 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
117. Amgen uses CHO, Chinese hamster ovary, cells in its production of
Epogen®. Id. at 1321. Both Neupogen® and Epogen® are "blockbuster" drugs.
The definition of "blockbuster" varies. One author has stated that a blockbuster
drug is one that is expected to achieve annual sales of at least $750 million by
2007. Ken Welsby, Big Pharma Companies Play Game of Patents in Quest for
Blockbuster, BUSINESS A.M. (April 26, 2002). Another author defines
"blockbuster" as those drugs that generate $1 billion in sales per year. Blockbuster
Drugs Becoming Bigger Sources of Pharmaceutical Industry Profits, NationsBanc
Mongomery Securities Analyst Tells Investors, BUSINESS WIRE, September 23,
1998.
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patents because the end product is the same.118  Additionally, the
drug, Epogen®, has the same function as the endogenous hormone,
erythropoiten, except in the drug the hormone is glycosolated.
Glycosylation is where a carbohydrate (or sugar) is added to an
amino acid in the protein. These are brief explanations, meant to
serve only as a terse primer of what will be elaborated upon, in detail,
below to illustrate the complexities of the science involved in
biotechnological patents.
III. CASE STUDIES
A. What is in a name? Interpretation of complex claim terminology:
Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. 119
Genentech, Inc. ("Genentech") brought suit against Amgen, Inc.
("Amgen") in 1996 for infringement on patents describing the use of
a recombinant cloning vehicle that enables a unicellular organism1 20
host to make large amounts of protein. 121 Genentech's patent issue
lies in the construction of that vehicle, known as a plasmid, involved
the use of the regulatory region, including the Shine-Dalgamo
sequence and start-site, derived from the bacteriophage lamda. 122
Those cloning techniques were used by Amgen to create the drug,
118. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
119. Genentech, Inc., 289 F.3d 761.
120. In this case E. coli, the same organism found in the human gut, is the
organism that is used to make the protein at issue. Id. E. coli is a very common
choice for these types of applications. ALBERTS, supra note 4, at 417-20.
121. Denise Gellene, Court Revives Genentech Lawsuit Against Amgen, Los
ANGELES TIMES, April 30, 2002, at 5(3), available at 2002 WL 2472126. See
generally Genentech, Inc., 289 F.3d 761.
122. Genentech, Inc., 289 F.3d at 766-67. Amgen's plasmid's regulatory
region contains seventy-two base pairs which are identical to that contained in the
bacteriophage lambda. Id. Note, a bacteriophage is "any virus that infects
bacteria." ALBERTS, supra note 4, at G-2. The bacteriophage lamda is commonly
known in molecular biology as a cloning vector, or a means to insert DNA into a
host organism, such as E. coli. Id.
Neupogen®, a protein that accelerates the replication of human white
blood cells. 12
3
The district court found no literal infringement where it
interpreted "determined that a 'control region' . . . must come from a
single operon, and that a 'ribosome binding site' encompasses the S-
D [Shine-Dalgamo] sequence, the start site as well as the linker base-
pairs."'124 The district court was affirmed in its decision to disallow
Genentech from asserting infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents as it was not alleged in the complaint. 125 However, the
Federal Circuit determined that the district court had relied on an
"erroneous claim construction in granting Amgen's motion for
summary judgment."' 126  The Federal Circuit vacated the district
court's summary judgment verdict that Amgen had not infringed on
various patents held by Genentech. 127  This discussion focuses
primarily on the portion of that opinion discussing the discrepancies
in interpretation of claims having to do with the definition of the
''control region" of the DNA.
The Federal Circuit properly reviewed the claim construction
issue de novo. 128 The court stated that U.S. District Court Judge
Alsup's dismissal of the suit was "based on a faulty interpretation of
terms used in the patents."' 129  The disputed terms describe the
"control region" of the genes contained within the bacterial cells,
which initiate the production of the human protein contained
therein. 130 District Court Judge Smith, Judge Alsup's predecessor in
this case, interpreted the relevant terms in the claims of the patents at
issue in his claim construction order given in May of 1999.131 After
123. Genentech, Inc., 289 F.3d at 767. The production of Neupogen® is from
the transcription and translation of the gene for met-hGCSF. Id. at 766 (citing
Original Summary Judgment Order at 2).
124. Id. at 767.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 764.
127. Id.
128. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc).
129. Gellene, supra note 121, at C5.
130. Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See
discussion of science primer, supra Sec. II, for further explanation.
131. Genentech, Inc., 289 F.3d at 765-66.
judicial FitnessFall 2003
526 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-2
Judge Smith issued this opinion, the case was transferred to Judge
Alsup.132  Judge Alsup determined that it was improper for the
district court to include linker DNA contained between the Shine-
Dalgarno sequence and the start codon (ATG) as part of the
"ribosome binding site." 133 On review, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the term "ribosome binding site" is properly defined as a "DNA
sequence that is an irreducible constituent of the expression control
region that, when transcribed into mRNA, is bound by the ribosome
and is thus necessary and sufficient to initiate translation." 134 The
Federal Circuit's conclusion was similar to the interpretation of
"ribosome binding site" asserted by Judge Smith, which ultimately
was not accepted by Judge Alsup in his determination of the case at
the district court level. 135 This discrepancy resulted in genuine issue
as to whether the linker DNA was necessary to initiate translation,
requiring the Federal Circuit to affirm in part, 136 vacate in part, and
remand the district court's determination. 37
The Federal Circuit agreed with Judge Smith's finding that
"DNA [comprising the control region] may be 'taken from' the listed
sources: it may be physically obtained, cloned, partially chemically
synthesized or totally chemically synthesized." 138 These
determinations were in contrast to the conclusions drawn by Judge
Alsup who stated that "where the term 'ribosome binding site'
reduced to the Shine-Dalgamo sequence and the start codon ATG, it
would be impossible to determine whether a ribosome binding site
was derived from the same operon 139 as the promoter 140 and the
132. Id.
133. Id. at 769-70.
134. Id. at 770 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. C 96-3752 FMS,
slip op. (N.D.Cal. May 17, 1999) (Order)).
135. Id. at 767.
136. The court affirmed those portions of the district court's decision to bar the
assertion of theory of infringement under to doctrine of equivalents as it was not
alleged by Genentech. Id. at 774.
137. Id.
138. Id .at 770 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. C 96-3752 FMS,
slip op. 37-38 (N.D.Cal. May 17, 1999) (Order, at 50)).
139. An operon, as discussed in the Genentech case, is a cluster of genes that
are transcribed as a single mRNA, but make separate proteins. FAIRBANKS, supra
note 108, at 218.
operator,14 1 a requirement of the term 'control region."'
' 142
Essentially, Judge Alsup determined that the control region possesses
control elements that correspond to only one operon.
143  This
interpretation prompted his conclusion that Amgen's ribosome
binding site DNA was not physically "taken from" the bacteriophage
lambda and thus was not an infringement on Genentech's 
patents.144
On review, the Federal Circuit agreed with Genentech's argument
that Judge Alsup misinterpreted
the meaning of the claim term "control region" by
requiring "(1) that the method used to construct the
control region use only one operon, and (2) that to
prove this single operon source requirement was
satisfied, the sequence of each control element must
correspond to a control element found in one, and only
one, operon."'
' 45
The Federal Circuit continued to state that, this interpretation does
not preserve the distinction between the sequence of the control
140. A promoter is defined as a sequence of DNA upstream (located before)
from the sequence encoding the target protein where the RNA polymerase will
bind. Genentech, Inc., 289 F.3d at 765.
141. An operator is a sequence of DNA located upstream from the encoding
DNA sequence for the target protein, which controls transcription, and therefore
protein expression. Genentech, Inc., 289 F.3d at 765.
142. Id. at 770 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. C 96-03752
WHA, slip op. (N.D.Cal. Aug. 28, 2000) (Amended Summary Judgment Order at
14)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 770-71 (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. C 96-03752
WHA, slip op. (N.D.Cal. Aug. 28, 2000) (Amended Summary Judgment Order at
14)). Genentech's patented plasmid is derived from the bacteriophage lamda. Id.
at 766-67. The sequence in that plasmid that is contained between the Shine-
Dalgarno sequence and the start codon is comprised of ten base pairs,
"AATCCAGATG." Id. at 767. In contrast, the sequence in Amgen's plasmid is
different in content and in number with thirteen base pairs,
"GTAATAAATAATG." Id. Thus, if the court determined that this linker
sequence is essential, because Amgen's sequence is different, there would not be
infringement.
145. Id. at 771.
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region and the method by which the control region is constructed. 46
Federal Circuit Judge Rader observed in a footnote that this
confusion arises from the original claim construction's requirement
that the control region "be taken from a single operon."' 147  Judge
Rader stated that "the method by which the control region is
constructed and the sources from which it is derived are inapposite,
thus negating any requirement that such methods or sources be
discernable from the sequence of the control elements."'148 The
Federal Circuit ultimately held that
the asserted claims require at least a promoter, operator,
and a ribosome binding site that when transcribed into
mRNA, is bound by the ribosome and is necessary and
sufficient for the initiation of translation. The promoter,
operator and ribosome binding site must correspond to
the promoter, operator and ribosome binding site found
in a single operon; the sources and methods used to
construct the control region are irrelevant. 49
In summary, the Federal Circuit derived a very different
interpretation to a essential term in the patent than the district court
Judge. In essence, Genentech's claim of infringement rests, in part, on
whether the court determines if thirteen base pairs that reside between
the Shine-Dalgarno sequence and the start codon of Amgen's plasmid,
are essential to drive cellular machinery to make Neupogen®.150 This
discrepancy prompted the Circuit court to vacate and remand this
portion of the decision for further proceedings. 151  The inherent
complexity of this issue presents a formidable task to the court on
remand. Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. exemplifies the discontinuity
of claim interpretation between the district court and the Federal Circuit
146. Id.
147. Id. at 771 n.4 (citation omitted). This terminology indicates that parts of
the operon (or collection of genes) that are ultimately used in the bacterial cell may
be derived from different origins such as different organisms or from synthesized
methods.
148. Id. at 772.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 766-67.
151. Idat 774.
and the importance of scientific knowledge in making such
determinations in patent litigation.
B. Process or Product? Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousell, Inc.
and Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. 
152
Amgen's debut into the biotechnology industry began with its
development and subsequent introduction of the blockbuster
therapeutic erythropoietin, or Epogen® as it is commonly known.
This product is a naturally occurring hormone that controls the
formation of red blood cells in the bone marrow. 153 Amgen's drug
product, Epogen®, has been very successful in the treatment of
patients, like kidney dialysis patients, needing red blood cells that
carry oxygen. Hoechst Marion Rousell, Inc. and Transkaryotic
Therapies, Inc. (collectively known as "TKT") sought to develop a
separate process for the production of Epgen® to create a
commercially competitive product, Dynepo . Amgen filed a
declaratory judgment action in April of 1997 for infringement on
various Amgen patents by TKT's Investigational New Drug
Application ("INDA"). 154  The court held a three day Markman
hearing at which point the case was tried over the course of four
months.1 55 At the District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Judge Young granted judgment in part for Amgen, and in part for
TKT. 156 The district court held that
(1) scope of asserted claims could not be limited to
expression of exogenous DNA; (2) patent satisfied
enablement requirement; (3) claims were product
152. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2003). This case is now known as Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
153. ALBERTS, supra note 4, at 1169-70.
154. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1319.
155. A Markman hearing is held in the absence of a jury where the judge
determines the scope of the claims in the patent for issues of infringement and
validity. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir.
1995), aff'd 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Often these hearings will end a case where there
is a narrow interpretation of the claims held within the patent.
156. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.
Mass. 2001).
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claims, not product by process claims; (4) alleged
infringer could challenge only adequacy of disclosure
of vertebrate or mammalian host cell, not human DNA
itself; and (5) lack of description of, or limitation
directed to, expression vector itself did not render
invention inoperable. 157
TKT appealed urging that the Amgen's patents were
unenforceable, that the district court's claim construction was
erroneous, and even if the claim construction was correct, that the
validity determinations were incorrect. 158 Amgen cross appealed
asserting that the district court was wrong in comparing the process
to the "examples in the specification rather than the limitations of the
method claims" of the patents and in holding another patent invalid
because it did not comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1.159 The
Federal Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
In Judge Michel's opinion, the district court was commended for
their thorough and precise work on what is termed a "legally difficult
and technologically complex case."' 60  Although reversal rates on
claim construction issues has been reported at 33%161 and even at
47%, 162 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court in total on this
matter. 163 Judge Michel also affirmed much of the district court's
other rulings.164 However, a number of determinations were vacated
because the district court misapplied the law, and were consequently
remanded to the district court to consider:
157. Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see
Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d 69.
158. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
159. Id. at 1320.
160. Id.
161. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2001), reprinted in 12 FED. CIR. B. J. 1
(2002). Further, where district courts were reversed on claim construction, the
Federal Circuit either reversed or remanded the decision 81% of the time. Id.
162. Victoria Slind-Flor, The Markman Prophecies, IP WORLDWIDE, March
13, 2002.
163. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1319.
164. Id.
(i) whether the '080, '349, and '422 patents are
obvious in light of the Sugimoto prior art or
anticipated or obvious in light of the Goldwasser prior
art; (ii) whether the '422 patent is anticipated by
Sugimoto reference (and whether Amgen can prove its
nonenbablement); (iii) whether the asserted claims of
the '698 patent and '349 patent claim 7 are infringed
by the accused method; and (iii) [sic] whether the '080
patent is infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
165
Judge Michel vacated the district court's finding of no
infringement because Amgen did not meet its burden by simply
showing that "GA-EPO has glycosylation which differs from but one
of the many heterogeneous urinary EPOs."'16 6 The district court
recognized that this claim construction presented a "conundrum" to
those in the art wishing to practice the invention, a requirement for a
valid patent. 167  The Federal Circuit subsequently stated that
understanding this "conundrum" should have ended the inquiry,
because this type of ambiguity in claim scope is "at the heart of the
definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, para 2" and that the
patent was invalid. 168 Therefore, the judgment was vacated.
The Federal Circuit also vacated the district court's finding that
an amendment to one of Amgen's patents was made to avoid a
double patenting rejection.1 69 This argument rested on the premise
that the amendment qualified under the doctrine of equivalents. 170
Judge Michel stated that the Supreme Court's decision in Festo states
that while there is no absolute bar to the doctrine of equivalents that
"a narrowing amendment to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act
165. Id. at 1319-20.
166. Id. at 1341 (quoting Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 129).
167. Id at 1342.
168. Id. at 1342.
169. Id. at 1345 (citing Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 135).
170. Id.
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may give rise to an estoppel."' 17 1 Thus, this determination was
vacated and remanded for analysis under the rule set forth in Festo.172
Most interestingly, the district court analyzed infringement of
Amgen's patent by interpreting the phrase "operatively linked" in
one of the claims of an Amgen patent.173 According to that court, the
phrase related to the relationship between the promoter DNA and the
DNA transcribed downstream from the promoter DNA. 174 Amgen
asserted that the phrase means "positioned such that it provides for
initiation of transcription of a gene." 175  TKT contended that
"operatively linked" meant positioned adjacent "to the DNA
encoding EPO in a way that maintains the capability to initiate
transcription of EPO DNA."' 176  These definitions differ in that
Amgen's definition imposes no spatial restriction, and TKTs
definition limited the location of the promoter as immediately
adjacent to the gene encoding EPO. 177 The district court adopted the
definition proffered by TKT and granted summary judgment of non-
infringement. 178 On appeal, Amgen contended that this conclusion
was not in accordance with law because the differences outlined
above were considered "dispositive by the district court . .. [and
were] not claimed and thus gave no bearing on proper infringement
analysis."' 179 Amgen further argued that the court did not identify any
limitation of the patent that the process failed to meet and did not
explain why, if it did so by other equivalent means. 180 For this
reason the issue was vacated.
The district court went the furthest astray in their analysis of the
process claims at issue. Judge Michel notes that the court properly
recognized the law to be followed in process claims, but after
171. Id. at 1345 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki,
535 U.S. 722 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1346.
174. Id.
175. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 90).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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discussing the differences between process and infringement
analysis, the court "eschewed the cardinal principle that the accused
device must be compared to the claims rather than to a preferred
commercial embodiment."' 81 The court found that there was a
fundamental distinction between the processes of Amgen and TKT in
that TKT employs homologous rather than heterologous
recombination, and Amgen "transfects' 82 [CHO]' 83 cells with a
vector'84 that contains both viral promoter DNA and the human EPO
gene."' 185 In recognizing the distinction, the district court missed the
point that none of the claims at issue contained such a limitation. 186
Similarly, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the district court
"found material the fact that TKT places its promoter and enhancer
farther upstream than does Amgen."'' 87  This assertion does not
address the process, but the claim itself. Thus, the Federal Circuit
found legal error in that the infringement analysis was not tied to the
asserted claims. This issue was also vacated so that a proper
infringement inquiry could be done.
In addition, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded
determinations by the district court having to do with "prior art"
asserted by TKT to prove that Amgen's patents were invalid because
at the time they were filed the inventions were either obvious, or not
novel. 188
Judge Clevenger filed a dissenting opinion stating that the claims
lacked meaningful limitations on the structure of the erythropoiten-
producing cells that the district court in looking at whether the claims
met the requirements of enablement and written description
181. Id. at 1347 (citing Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 102).
182. Transfection is the process of getting the DNA into the cell of choice.
183. "CHO" is an acronym for Chinese Hamster Ovary cells. This cell line is
frequently used in these types of processes.
184. A vector is a piece of DNA that is constructed so that it can go through
the cell membrane and to the nucleus where it will be able to transcribe the
functional gene.
185. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 102).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1356.
Fall 2003 Judicial Fitness
534 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1.189 The dissent also expressed
its disagreement in the majority's finding that the district court's
application of the written description requirement was proper as
expressed in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly &
Co.,190 and Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.19'
Like Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. the district court in this case
struggled with claim interpretation where background knowledge of
the biological processes at issue was integral to making a just
decision. Similarly, on appeal the Federal Circuit interpreted those
claims differently than the district court mandating that the judgment
be vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Determinations
such as these undercut confidence in the courts. The result is that
parties with similar claims must appeal decisions from the district
court level, thereby incurring additional costs in order to assure a
definite judgment.
IV. PROPOSAL
There is a challenge, as illustrated by Genentech and Hoechst, to
help tribunals understand the content of patent claims so that
decision-makers can ensure fair judgments through proper claim
interpretation. Modifications to the way these types of inventions are
analyzed in the district court and in the Federal Circuit will .ensure
that once a patent is granted, the owner can rest assured that the
rights conferred to him will not be stripped due to faulty
interpretation of the science behind his innovation. There are many
alternatives to meeting this challenge.
Perhaps the simplest remedy would be to give more deference to
determinations made in the PTO during examination and hearings
before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. This could be
limited to those decisions that require the interpretation of the
technology presented in the invention. As discussed above, the PTO
has already implemented regulations requiring scientific expertise
189. Id. at 1358-59.
190. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Eli Lilly Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
191. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
23 -2
and legal understanding by their adjudicators.' 92  Granting a
heightened degree of deference to this agency would alleviate the
burden placed on courts in learning the technologies presented on
appeal and would allow those courts to focus on legal issues within
their expertise.
Another relatively straightforward way to remedy this problem
would be to modify drafting techniques so that they are written in
plain English rather than legalese. 193 This trend has already had a
positive effect in the field of life insurance policy drafting and
interpretation. 194 The caveat to this suggestion is, of course, that in
the drafting of patent documents a certain amount of scientific jargon
is necessary to convey the invention accurately to the PTO and to
members in the scientific community wishing to replicate or practice
the invention. However, coupled with other suggestions, such as
requiring technical clerks, or technical backgrounds from judges,
changes in patent drafting could remedy the complex nature of patent
language.
As suggested by Mark T. Banner, the chair of the ABA section of
intellectual property, special procedures for treating claim
construction litigation could be created either formally by statute or
informally through judicial practice.1 95 These new procedures could
be mirrored after those adopted by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California. 196 That district has a very readable
list of procedures, on their website, which are followed in patent
proceedings on their website. 197 Specifically, in claim construction
proceedings parties are ordered to meet and confer at various stages
192. See supra section I, notes 27-30.
193. S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-
First Century: Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 72
(2001) (suggesting that patent drafting follow the example of life insurance
policies).
194. Id.
195. Mark T. Banner, Is Markman Right? 7(3) THE ABA SECT. OF
INTELLECTUAL PROP. L., CHAIR'S BULLETIN 1, 2 (November 2002).
196.
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/LocalRul.nsf/fec20e529a5572f0882569b60066
07e0/4735alc69bdl8b418825695f00730cdd/$FILE/Patl200-1.pdf (last visited
February 13, 2003)).
197. Id.
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of litigation. They are further required to file a "Joint Claim
Construction and Prehearing Statement" which contains, among
many other things, that the parties state all "terms, phrases, or
clauses" on which the parties agree and disagree.198 Parties are also
mandated to submit a wealth of references and extrinsic evidence
supporting their interpretation of the claims at issue. 199 This type of
standing order allows for predictability for both the parties and the
adjudicator. Similar orders in other districts, and perhaps at the
appellate level, would allow the courts to have a more precise
procedure to follow when dealing with these types of claims. A more
specific template of procedure to follow may narrow the issues that
need to be determined by the court, and ease the burden of gaining an
understanding of underlying technologies in claim interpretation
issues.
It has also been suggested that juries be prohibited from hearing
claim construction issues in order to attain more predictable and
consistent results at the district court level.200 One Federal Circuit
judge has noted that trial court determinations on infringement issues
are often decided on summary judgment, making the judge's decision
the "best shot at claim construction and the parties' agreement to
appeal the decision rather than go through a lengthy trial process and
get told years later by the [Federal Circuit] that the claim
construction was wrong." 20 1 This suggestion supports the current
trend in moving away from jury findings as exemplified in Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc.20 2 In Markman, the Federal Circuit
determined that it was for the judge to determine the scope of the
claims at issue in patent litigation. 20 3
Mr. Banner has also suggested formalizing the use of special
technical masters for claim construction issues in either an advisory
capacity to the court on technical questions, or to render advisory
198. Id. at § 4-3.
199. Id.
200. Plager, supra, note 193, at 72.
201. Id.
202. Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir.
1995), affd 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that interpretation of language set forth
in the claim is an issue for the judge rather than the jury).
203. Id.
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opinions.20 4 This action would allow adjudicators immediate access
to specialists capable of understanding the complexities of the patents
at issue and who would be able to convey these technicalities in an
understandable form. Some judges on the Federal Circuit currently
employ these types of specialists in their chambers. Formalizing this
process ensures preservation of the fairness within the court system
by not conveying either a pro- or anti- patent stance. The placement
of experts may also increase the integrity and perception of those
scholars selected to serve as technical masters.
The legislature could also designate a specialized court, similar to
that used for welfare recipients, that employs adjudicators with
appropriate scientific and legal backgrounds that would allow them
to make decisions efficiently. This alternative might be more
appealing than having special technical masters, as an adjudicator
would be in the best position to evaluate, in an unbiased manner,
claim construction, technical matters, and experts. Equipped with the
proper underlying knowledge of what the science of the innovation
is, rather than relying on someone else to distinguish those scientific
important scientific facts, would ensure a proper marriage between
the science and the law in litigation.
Additionally, a background component could be required of a
minimal percentage of judges on the Federal Circuit who hear cases
having to do with complex issues such as biotechnology. This would
guarantee, like the suggestion above, that scientific issues would be
heard through a singular entity who understands the technology and
who can apply the appropriate law in the case at hand. Arguably,
requiring all judges to have the requisite scientific understanding
would be unnecessary and cumbersome, disregarding the problem of
availability of appropriate candidates. One of the judges could be
reasonably charged with the responsibility of teaching the
background technical information to the other judges on the case.
Like other suggestions, this allows the adjudicator to weigh the
importance of all evidence, technical or not, and apply the law in an
appropriate manner.
Each of these suggestions, taken separately or in concert, would
significantly increase confidence in determining issues of
infringement and validity of inventions in the biotechnology field.
204. Banner, supra note 195, at 2.
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Appreciation for the complexity of the advancements in technology
dictates change in the system that protects those innovations. It is
imperative that our legislature and judiciary give them serious
consideration in formulating a better system.
V. CONCLUSION
Amgen and Hoescht illustrate the difficulty in determining patent
issues where the subject matter includes complex biological
processes. In both cases, district court judges looked at issues
necessitating interpretation of biotechnical claims and made
determinations requiring an understanding of the science underlying
the invention. These interpretations were not correct when reviewed
by the Federal Circuit who vacated and remanded those portions of
the decisions in both cases. Although neither case was vacated in its
entirety, it is evident that confidence in district court determinations
requiring an interpretation of scientific cases is waning. Further, it is
too much to expect the district courts, with their already crowded
dockets, to dedicate an appropriate amount of time to gain a proper
understanding of the scientific issues underlying patent claims. This
deficiency may motivate parties to continue litigation beyond the
district court, incurring more expenses, in order to assure an accurate
determination. 205 If decisions in patent cases continue to fall short of
acknowledging public appreciation of technology or established legal
paradigms, the patent system will erode. 20 6
Identifying this deficiency at the district court level is not a novel
concept. Other articles have addressed the diminished ability of the
205. In 1996 it was reported that the average cost of patent litigation was
$500,000. John J. O'Malley, Insurance Protects Intellectual Property; Company's
Most Important Asset Often Overlooked on Daily Basis, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, March 11, 1996 at S14. This amount has undoubtedly increased,
as evidenced by Amgen's recent arbitrated settlement with Johnson & Johnson,
where that company was ordered to pay $150 million to Amgen, which included
costs and attorney's fees. Other News to Note, 18(14) BIOWORLD TODAY,
January 28, 2003.
206. Lawrence M. Sung, Echoes of Scientific Truth in the Halls of Justice: The
Standards of Review Applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Patent-Related Matters, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1233, 1236 (1999) (citing
Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in the Federal
Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1231, 1245 (1994)).
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district courts to handle these complex issues. Specifically, regarding
the doctrine of equivalents, which states that something that is
essentially the equivalent of something else cannot be patented, the
district court has been scrutinized in its inability to deal with the
evaluation of science.2 °7
Problems in adjudicating patent issues do not stop at the district
court level, but continue to the Federal Circuit. The communication
between these two tribunals must become more consistent so that
patent owners can maintain confidence in the system that protects
their inventions to ensure the healthy progression of technologies.
20 8
The Supreme Court has recognized this need in Pfaff v. Wells
Electronics Inc., where the Court established a new test for the on-
sale bar to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).2 °9 In effect, this
test allows the court to concentrate on relevant non-technical
evidence rather than the technical and scientific aspects of the
invention.210 Pfaff does not encompass all issues in patent litigation
requiring an interpretation of scientific issues. Consequently, the
decision does not obliterate the need for adjudicators to have a means
of understanding the technologies underlying litigation as
demonstrated in Genentech, and Hoechst.
Although the suggestions above are proposed in the context of
biotechnological patents, they are also relevant to other rapidly
advancing technologies such as telecommunications, the internet, and
nanotechnology. Advancements in technology and the scope of
scientific ideologies employed in those technologies are too vast for
one group of persons to understand and to adjudicate. The
suggestions above do not undercut the value of the court system in
207. Id. at 1253 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17, 24 (1997) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the doctrine of
equivalents)).
208. In 2000, the Federal Circuit reversed all three decisions of lower courts on
the issue of priority in interference decisions. Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A.
Castanias, Mark N. Reiter, and Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal
Circuit's Patent Law Decisions in 2000: Y2K in Review, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1435,
1441 (2001) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Singh v. Brake 222 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Eaton v. Evans, 204
F.3d 1394 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
209. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998), aff'g 124 F.3d 1429
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Sung supra note 78, at 1253.
210. Id. at 62.
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determining these issues, but merely enhance what was begun nearly
three decades ago with the establishment of the Federal Circuit.
Rather than maintaining the status quo, the court and legislature, like
the scientific community, should embrace continued improvement.
Confidence in the judicial system through the protection of new
inventions fosters motivation and enthusiasm in the science and
promotes continued progress. It is necessary for our judicial system
to respond to these changes to ensure that the validity of the patent
system remains intact, thus fostering new innovation.
